Second it speaks to the assertion that the Community Covenant represents a voluntary choice not to engage in same-sex sexual intimacy. Third it rejects the contention that TWU welcomes gay and lesbian students. Fourth it challenges the distinction TWU supporters draw between a code of conduct that prohibits samesex intimacy and a policy that excludes gays and lesbians. Fifth it rejects the proposition, broadly accepted by the Benchers of the Law Society of BC, that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in BCCT is dispositive of the issue faced by law societies today. Sixth, it rejects the claim that opposition to public accreditation of TWU can be equated with opposition to a Christian worldview or the desirability of a faith-based university. The final section of the paper argues that the decision in some provinces not to accredit TWU's law degree is reasonable and will be respected by reviewing courts.

Il existe, à l'Université Trinity Western, un document appelé Community Covenant qui énonce des normes communautaires n'autorisant les minorités sexuelles à fréquenter l'Université qu'à un coût personnel considérable pour leur dignité
Introduction
In his thoughtful exploration of the British Columbia legal profession's historical record of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, political belief, and ethnic origin, Wesley Pue writes of the twentieth century: "Only the crudest, earliest, and most obvious of these [discriminatory] obstacles involved a formal policy of exclusion…."
1 The Law Society of British Columbia is not known for its history of inclusivity. When it-along with the Faculty of Law at the University of British Columbia (UBC)-excluded Kew Dock Yip from admission, it denied access to the practice of law to a man who became a Canadian hero. 2 In legal circles Kew Dock Yip was perhaps most well known for his role in bringing about the repeal of the federal government's Chinese Exclusion Act.
3 Mr. Yip, the first lawyer in Canada of Chinese descent, is among Osgoode Hall Law School's most celebrated graduates. 4 He spent his legal career practicing in Toronto, where for many years he was the only Chinese-speaking lawyer in town. 5 Despite his later connection to Toronto, Kew Dock Yip was born and raised in Vancouver. 6 Mr. Yip was an Osgoode Hall alumnus because in 1942, when he was seeking admission to law school, the Faculty of Law at UBC did not accept students of Chinese descent on the basis that the Law Society of British Columbia expressly excluded Chinese Canadians. 7 On 11 April 2014, the Law Society of British Columbia accredited a law degree program from a university with a formal policy of exclusion on the basis of sexual orientation. 8 Later that month, the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society refused to approve that same program because of concerns regarding the institution's discriminatory admissions policy. 9 During law society deliberations in Ontario on the issue of accreditation of this proposed law school, Bencher Avvy Yao-Yao Go invoked Kew Dock Yip's legacy. 10 The law degree approved by the LSBC is to be offered by Trinity Western University (TWU). TWU imposes admissions and hiring policies, through its mandatory Community Covenant, that exclude members of the LGBTQ community.
11 All student and staff applicants to TWU are required to sign a code of conduct pledging not to engage in same-sex intimacy. 12 As the Supreme Court of Canada concluded in Trinity Western v. British Columbia College of Teachers, TWU's mandatory Community Covenant perpetuates "unfavourable differential treatment" on the basis of sexual orientation and gay and lesbian individuals could only attend or work at the university at "considerable personal cost." 13 Despite its policy, TWU has been granted authority to confer law degrees by the government of British Columbia.
14 TWU has also sought to have its law school approved by each of the individual law societies in Canada. This would allow TWU's law graduates to gain admission to the bar in each of the provinces through the same process as students from other Canadian law schools.
The Federation of Law Societies of Canada (Federation), an umbrella organization that performs administrative functions for the law societies across Canada, is charged with reviewing proposed new law degree programs and making recommendations to the law societies regarding accreditation. 15 In response to concerns about TWU's proposed law While this observation about the systemic and substantive inequality that pervades legal education in Canada is a critical one, its role in the debate regarding TWU is questionable. TWU, unlike every fully accredited law school in this country, has an institutional policy of formal discrimination. Unfortunately, the argument advanced by critics such as Mathen and Plaxton obfuscates the distinction between substantive inequality and its most obvious and crude progenitor-formal discrimination. This is certainly not to suggest that formal discrimination is worse, but it is more obvious. 12. TWU community members are required to pledge that they will abstain from "sexual intimacy that violates the sacredness of marriage between a man and a woman. Report] . Given that the SAC was a subcommittee of the Federation and that the Federation appears to have adopted the SAC position as its own, the reasoning, conclusions and recommendations drawn by the SAC should be attributed to the Federation as a whole. In this article the SAC and Federation will be used interchangeably. 17. See Law Society of Alberta [LSAB] , Bulletin (14 January 2014), online: LSAB <http:// www.lawsociety.ab.ca/docs/default-source/default-document-library/2014/ebulletins/ bulletin_2014_01jan_14.htm?sfvrsn=2>. 18. The vote was 3,210 in favour, 968 opposed. See Law Society of British Columbia, "Resolution Adopted at Law Society's Special General Meeting" (10 June 2014), online: LSBC <http://www. lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=3926&t=Resolution-adopted-at-Law-Society's-special-generalmeeting> [LSBC Resolution]. As a result of the resolution, on 26 September 2014 the LSBC reconsidered its decision to approve TWU. At that meeting a motion was passed to conduct a binding referendum allowing all members of the LSBC to vote on whether to implement a resolution declaring that the proposed TWU law school is not an approved faculty of law for the purpose of the LSBC's admission program. See "Law Society to hold member referendum on accreditation of TWU," online: The Law Society of British Columbia <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=3975&t=Law-Society-to-hold-member-referendum-on-accreditation-of-TWU>. A similar set of events has occurred in New Brunswick in response to the Law Society of New Brunswick's decision to approve TWU. On 13 September 2014 at a Special General Meeting, members of the LSNB passed a resolution directing their Council not to approve TWU. The Council of the LSNB has indicated that it will consider whether to adopt the resolution. See "Law Society Deals With TWU Issue," online: Law Society of New Brunswick <http://lawsociety-barreau.nb.ca/uploads/SGM_PR.pdf>. initiated legal proceedings to challenge the decisions in Ontario and Nova Scotia. 19 The decision to grant or refuse public accreditation of TWU's proposed law degree has produced significant controversy both within and beyond the legal profession. 20 Both proponents and opponents of approval have offered legal and policy based arguments in favour of their positions. 21 In "The Case for the Federation of Law Societies Rejecting Trinity Western University's Proposed Law Degree Program" I advanced an analysis that opposed approval by Canada's law societies of TWU's proposal. 22 Since that article was published the debate has progressed and become more focussed: the Federation, the LSBC and the LSUC have obtained legal opinions 23 ; at least four law societies have engaged in public consultation processes involving voluminous written and oral submissions 24 ; and the first round of law society decisions has been made. 25 The Federation, as well as many of those who made submissions to the law societies in Ontario, Nova Scotia and British Columbia, engaged explicitly with the arguments I developed in that article. 26 Several of the legal opinions obtained by the law societies in Ontario and British Columbia responded specifically to my arguments. 27 The purpose of this essay is threefold: first, to offer a reply to those proponents of granting law society accreditation to TWU's proposed program that addressed the arguments I advanced in "The Case for Rejecting TWU's Proposed Law School"; second, to respond to the main arguments that TWU and others have advanced since I published "The Case for Rejecting TWU's Proposed Law School"; and third, to demonstrate that the decisions of the LSUC and the NSBS were reasonable, proportionate and just and should be upheld by reviewing courts.
The remainder of this article is divided into seven sections, each intended to respond to an argument that has been advanced in favour of law society accreditation of TWU's law school. The first section responds to the claim that TWU does not actually discriminate against the LGBTQ community. The second speaks to the assertion that the Community Covenant represents a voluntary choice not to engage in same-sex sexual intimacy. This section also addresses attempts to trivialize the impact of the Community Covenant. Following this is a rejection, in section three, of TWU's contention that it welcomes gay and lesbian students. Section four challenges the distinction TWU supporters draw between a code of conduct that prohibits same-sex intimacy and a policy that excludes gays and lesbians. Section five rejects the proposition that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in BCCT is dispositive of the issue faced by law societies today. Increased legal recognition of the equality interests of sexual minorities will inform what constitutes a reasonable and proportionate balance between equality and freedom of religion. Section six rejects the claim that opposition to public accreditation of TWU can be equated with opposition to a Christian worldview or the desirability of a faith-based 25 ) Trinity Western University requires its students and staff to sign a contract committing themselves not to engage in same-sex sexual intimacy because it is-in the words the university has chosen-"vile" and "shameful."
29 Despite this policy, representatives of TWU have stated that they do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and the Federation appears to have accepted this assertion.
30 TWU has asserted a commitment to principles of equality and non-discrimination with respect to gays and lesbians. 31 In addition to being contrary to the prohibition in its Community Covenant, these assertions are inconsistent with both TWU's non-discrimination policy and with its current and historic response to the issue of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
First, as I noted in "The Case for Rejecting TWU's Proposed Law School," sexual orientation is conspicuously absent from the lengthy list of grounds upon which TWU declares itself not to discriminate.
32 Sexual orientation is the only prohibited ground of discrimination under British Columbia's human rights legislation, other than religion, that is not 28. The focus of this article is on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. However, TWU's Covenant also discriminates on the basis of sex (by prohibiting abortion) and marital status (by prohibiting sexual intimacy between unmarried heterosexuals). See Letter from Janine Benedet, Director, Centre for Feminist Legal Studies, UBC, to Timothy McGee, Executive Director, Law Society of British Columbia (24 February 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/ newsroom/TWU-submissions.pdf> (arguing that the TWU Covenant shames women who seek abortion). See also the Legal Opinion of Andrew Pinto, supra note 23 (noting that the Community Covenant appears to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, sex, and marital status). 29. As noted, TWU will not hire you nor will it admit you as a student unless you sign a covenant promising not to engage in "sexual intimacy that violates the sacredness of marriage between a man and a woman." Covenant Agreement, supra note 11. In support of this covenant TWU cites the following:
Romans 1:26: For this cause God gave them up unto vile affections: for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature. Romans 1:27: In the same way the men also abandoned natural relations with women and were inflamed with lust for one another. Men committed shameful acts with other men, and received in themselves the due penalty for their error. protected by TWU's anti-discrimination policy. 33 This absence should not be overlooked.
Second, TWU's response both in the 1990s when the British Columbia College of Teachers raised concerns with the Covenant, and again in the current context, is not consistent with a commitment to equality for gays and lesbians. 34 In both instances TWU's response was to argue vociferously that the teaching profession and the legal profession should not be permitted to even consider whether TWU's policy raises public interest concerns regarding discrimination against gays and lesbians. 35 The Supreme Court of Canada rightly rejected TWU's view on this issue. 36 Taking the position that those charged with stewarding the profession of public school teachers or licensing and regulating lawyers should not be allowed to even consider issues of discrimination in fulfilling their responsibilities does not reveal a commitment to non-discrimination. The institutional autonomy of a university that seeks to provide accredited professional programs is simply not as extensive as would be the institutional autonomy of a church. Before accrediting, professional regulators must be permitted to consider institutional policies that discriminate. The most recent example of TWU's resistance to equality protections for gays and lesbians can be found in its vocal (and unsuccessful) opposition to the 2014 anti-discrimination resolution passed by the membership of the Canadian Bar Association.
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Many of the arguments urging the Federation and individual law societies in Canada not to approve TWU's program stem from the proposition that it is not in the public interest to approve an institution that 33. Elaine Craig, "The Case for Rejecting TWU's Proposed Law School," supra note 22 at 162. This is not to suggest that TWU does not discriminate on grounds such as marital status or sex. Rather it is to note the significance of adopting a non-discrimination policy with an extensive list of prohibited grounds that does not include sexual orientation. 41 The Court also accepted that an exemption under British Columbia's human rights legislation permits religious organizations to prefer religious adherents. 42 The Court did not make a finding of non-discrimination. Nor did it find that the exemption under British Columbia's laws allows TWU to exclude based on sexual orientation. 43 However, the Court did conclude that TWU's policy perpetuates "unfavourable differential treatment" on the basis of sexual orientation and that gay and lesbian students could only attend TWU at "considerable personal cost." 44 These are the very phrases that the Supreme Court of Canada has used to identify and define discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in other decisions. 45 In an effort to minimize the impact of the Covenant, some supporters of TWU have implied that significance should be attributed to the distinction in wording between the version of the code of conduct at issue in BCCT and the version that is currently used. 46 The previous version has been characterized as more forcefully worded-presumably intended to imply that it was more problematic. 47 Not only is the practical effect of today's Covenant the same as that of its previous incarnation-a prohibition on same-sex sexual intimacy-but the suggestion that it is less forceful in its condemnation of gay sex is not convincing. The previous version identified homosexuality as biblically condemned. 48 The current version prohibits same-sex intimacy and cites in support of this prohibition biblical passages that characterize same-sex intimacy as "vile" and "shameful." 49 The Federation misconstrued the Court's conclusions in BCCT. The Federation's SAC Report makes no mention of the Court's conclusion that TWU's policy perpetuates unfavourable differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. The SAC report does not include reference to the Court's finding that it would only be at considerable personal cost that a gay or lesbian student could attend TWU. Instead, the Federation, through its adoption of the SAC Report, asserts that there is nothing to suggest that TWU's covenant limits access to the university by LGBT individuals.
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The Federation did not recognize the considerable personal cost and the unfavourable differential treatment imposed on LGBT individuals as a limit on admission to TWU's proposed law school. Rather than recognizing this limit, and the considerable dignity interest that underpins it, the Federation significantly understates the Covenant's impact on LGBT individuals by concluding that gay and lesbians students would merely "feel unwelcome" at TWU.
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The Federation's incomplete treatment of the Court's findings in BCCT gives the misperception that the Court in BCCT held that TWU's policies do not discriminate. This is an inaccurate characterization of the Court's reasoning. A proper interpretation of the reasoning in BCCT reveals that the Court did in fact find that TWU discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation. ). Of significance to the issue of approval is the impact on sexual minorities perpetuated by a public institution that accredits or approves a university with a formal policy that prohibits same-sex sexual intimacy. The faith-based community at TWU espouses, through its Community Covenant, a profound, deeply held belief that sexual activity between two men or two women is wrong. 55 TWU argues that this prohibition on same-sex sexual intimacy is fundamental to TWU's community. 56 Whether this belief is stupid is not relevant to the decisions of the law societies. It is the actions taken by the university in furtherance of this deeply held belief that raise concerns regarding accreditation of its proposed law degree.
II. TWU's prohibition on same-sex intimacy is neither silly nor voluntary
This leads to the second point. There is nothing silly about the potential impact on the LGBTQ community and on individual sexual minorities perpetuated by the public sanctioning of a university that explicitly and formally discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation. To dismiss this conviction as silly (presumably done in an effort to minimize its potential impact on sexual minorities or to distance oneself from its homophobic message), while at the same time asserting the profound and fundamental importance of this religious belief for TWU, seems insincere. 57 -is without foundation. TWU's Community Covenant is not a guideline or invitation to abstain from same-sex intimacy. It is a covenant-a formal arrangement that all staff and students must sign in order to work at, or attend, this university. TWU describes it as a "contractual agreement" that all members of the university must enter into before joining the "TWU community." 58 The assertion that TWU should be accredited because the Covenant is voluntary is another way of saying that gays and lesbians who cannot or will not sign the Covenant can go elsewhere. The argument that gays and lesbians can simply go elsewhere to become lawyers is problematic. As TWU noted in its effort to demonstrate to the BC government that there is a need for more law schools in the province: "Canada has the lowest number of law schools per capita of any Commonwealth country….
[Applications] currently vastly outnumber the spaces available."
59 Law school seats are a finite public good. Some LGBTQ students may not have the option to attend another Canadian law school. Moreover, as a matter of equality, meaningful access to a legal education in Canada should not differ depending on a student's sexual orientation. , where he characterizes the Community Covenant as a "perspective" or "discussion" asserting: "the public gatekeeper role of the legal profession cannot properly be used to exclude from the legal profession those who have dared to discuss different perspectives on the law[.]" This is a misleading characterization of the Covenant both in terms of its impact and the text itself. The question is whether the "public gatekeeper" to the legal profession should refuse to approve a law school with a policy that excludes gays and lesbians. 58. Community Covenant, supra note 11. 59. Trinity Western Office of the Provost, "Program Proposal: Juris Doctor" 29 April 2012 as cited by Letter from Kathleen Lahey to Policy Secretariate, online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/ uploadedFiles/TWULahey,KathleenMarch28.pdf>. The Court in BCCT placed emphasis on the proposition that gays and lesbians could study elsewhere if they were unwilling to sign the Covenant. Section 5, below, argues that today this reasoning is likely to be rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada given contemporary legal and social norms.
III. TWU does not welcome sexual minorities
Representatives of TWU have repeatedly claimed that gay and lesbian students are welcome at their institution. 60 This suggestion defies logic. Not only are prospective students required to sign a covenant promising not to engage in same-sex sexual intimacy under any circumstances, but they are also required to police each other for any breaches of this promise. 61 The Covenant makes every member of the TWU community complicit in its discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The failure on the part of this institution to grasp the violation of dignity-the impact of requiring a gay or lesbian student to sign this agreement-speaks volumes about the institutional environment in which this proposed law school is to operate.
TWU has asserted that there is nothing offensive or inimical to Canadian society contained in the Covenant. 62 This failure to apprehend the profound shift in Canadian societal values in the last several decades also raises concerns regarding the institutional environment in which law students at TWU will be educated.
63 TWU prohibits gay sex. Perhaps such a prohibition would not have been offensive to a Canadian society that criminalized anal and oral sex between men, 64 that designated convicted "homosexuals" as dangerous offenders sanctioned with indefinite preventative detention, 65 or that spied on, interrogated, and expunged from public service thousands of individuals suspected of homosexuality in the 1950s and 1960s. 66 In Canadian society today an institutional prohibition on gay sex is offensive. Far more importantly, approval by a public 63. Dianne Pothier describes this failure in the following way: "TWU can argue that, in accordance with their religious beliefs, they are entitled to give offense because sexual intimacy outside marriage between a man and a woman is immoral according to their interpretation of the bible. But to claim no offense accepts no accountability for the position they take, and shows a fundamental lack of understanding of equality principles by failing to come even remotely close to appreciating the perspective of those excluded." Dianne Pothier, "An Argument Against Accreditation of Trinity Western University's Proposed Law School" (2014) regulator of an institutionalized prohibition on same-sex sexual intimacy is inimical to a Canadian society that has taken significant legal strides to overcome its appalling and tragic historical legal treatment of sexual minorities.
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TWU has also asserted that there is no evidence that Christians at TWU hide homophobia or hostility to gays and lesbians in Christian values. 68 As a matter of common sense, a ban on gay and lesbian sex does seem indicative of hostility towards gays and lesbians. However, setting that aside, there is some other evidence of homophobia at TWU. In addition to the affidavit of a former TWU student who experienced the university as oppressively intolerant of her sexuality, 69 consider the comments of TWU's Director of Residence in 2013 70 asserting the need to "help…a person with same-sex attraction [to] disassociate with a 'gay' identity…." 71 He asserts that "we should not be content with someone remaining…in a life long place of identifying themselves as 'gay.'" 72 He describes his efforts to help gay men realize that their same-sex attraction is "a struggle rather than an inherent part" of them. 73 He states that in his role as Director of Residence of TWU his hope is to challenge a student's perspective that he must be resigned to the fact that he is gay. 74 at TWU, a failure on his part to address this "unhealthy identity" would be negligent.
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Following a 2009 report from the American Psychological Association indicating evidence of the harms caused by therapies aimed at changing an individual's same-sex sexual orientation, 76 the state of California enacted a law prohibiting mental health providers from engaging in "sexual orientation change efforts" with patients under the age of 18. 77 The types of harms identified in the APA Report include depression, increased suicidality and anxiety. 78 The APA also noted recent studies concluding that individuals subject to religious efforts to change their sexual orientation reported experiencing similar harms. 79 In Canada and the United States, LGBTQ youth are significantly more likely than their straight counterparts to suffer depression and attempt suicide. 80 The Director of Residence of TWU, presumably a position with significant student contact, asserts that while acting in that capacity he would be negligent if he did not try to change the "unhealthy" sexual orientation of his gay students. 81 He bases this perspective on his Christian values.
82
A school that prohibits same-sex sexual intimacy under any circumstances and employs in a student services capacity a Director of Residence publicly committed to using that role to convert students that are "struggling with a gay identity" can hardly be characterized as welcoming to members of the LGBTQ community. As noted in the previous section, even the Federation concluded that gay and lesbian students would not feel welcome at TWU. 83 Unfortunately, the Federation also stated that to its 75. Ibid. TWU would likely respond that efforts aimed at reorienting the unhealthy sexual identity of its gay students is done politely and with Christian love. Politeness is not a defence to discrimination and anti-gay actions do not become less homophobic because they are grounded in religious belief. 84 This assertion by the Federation was unexplained. Its report reveals no independent research by the Federation to explore whether limits or bans are, in fact, imposed on LGBT individuals. Presumably, the Federation's reasoning relies on drawing a distinction between prohibiting same-sex sexual activity (which it says would make LGBT students feel "unwelcome") and explicitly prohibiting LGBTQ students.
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IV. A code of conduct that prohibits same-sex sexual intimacy excludes gays and lesbians In Whatcott v. Saskatchewan the Supreme Court of Canada specifically rejected the argument that there is any legal significance to the distinction TWU draws between prohibiting same-sex sexual intimacy and prohibiting gays and lesbians. 86 In rejecting the argument that a legally significant distinction can be drawn between discriminating against homosexual behavior and discriminating against homosexuals, the Court stated:
Courts have thus recognized that there is a strong connection between sexual orientation and sexual conduct. Where the conduct targeted by speech is a crucial aspect of the identity of a vulnerable group, attacks on this conduct stand as a proxy for attacks on the group itself. I am dismayed that at various points in the history of this case the argument has been made that one can separate condemnation of the 'sexual sin' of 'homosexual behaviour' from intolerance of those with homosexual or bisexual orientations. This position alleges that one can love the sinner, but condemn the sin. ... The status/conduct or identity/practice distinction for homosexuals and bisexuals should be soundly rejected, as per Madam Justice Rowles: 'Human rights law states that certain practices cannot be separated from identity, such that condemnation of the practice is a condemnation of the person' (para. 228). She added that 'the kind of tolerance that is required [by equality] is not so impoverished as to include a general acceptance of all people but condemnation of the traits of certain people' (para. 230)….
[I]t is [not] possible to condemn a practice so central to the identity of a protected and vulnerable minority without thereby discriminating against its members and affronting their human dignity and personhood. 88 Despite its discussion of, and reliance on, Whatcott, the Federation's SAC Report makes no reference to the Court's explicit approval of L'HeureuxDubé J.'s conclusion that the discriminatory effect of TWU's Covenant is not ameliorated simply because its prohibition is aimed at sexual conduct rather than sexual identity.
89 Not only is the Federation's SAC Report silent on this important aspect of Whatcott, but even more problematically it invokes exactly the love the sinner, hate the sin reasoning rejected by the Court in Whatcott.
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According to the Supreme Court of Canada, a policy that requires students to promise not to engage in same-sex intimacy is an attack on the "human dignity and personhood" of gays and lesbians. 91 In submissions to the LSUC, TWU argued that this interpretation of Whatcott is too broad and that Whatcott's rejection of the act/identity distinction should not apply to an assessment of TWU's Community Covenant. 92 This assertion is without merit. 93 The Supreme Court of Canada in Whatcott specifically used TWU's argument about its Community Covenant as an example of the affront to human dignity perpetuated by reliance on this fallacious distinction. The Federation, and those member law societies that have decided to adopt the Federation's recommendation, should have done better than to embrace the formalistic and impoverished view of equality so recently rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Whatcott. 95 The College declined an application to fully accredit TWU on the basis that it was not in the public interest to approve a teacher program from an institution that discriminated against gays and lesbians. The College was concerned that TWU graduates who entered public schools in British Columbia might discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. The Court found that: (1) homosexuals could go to teacher's college elsewhere, (2) the College had provided no evidence that TWU graduates would discriminate, and (3) there was no basis to infer that the College's purpose of requiring TWU students to complete a fifth year at a separate university was aimed at addressing issues of equality and discrimination. 96 As a result, the Court concluded that the College had not properly balanced freedom of religion and equality. 97 Many proponents of approval of TWU's proposed law degree have argued that the Court's decision in BCCT should be dispositive of the decision faced by law societies today. 98 However, changing legal and social conceptions of equality, different justifications for denying accreditation to TWU's law school, and a distinguishable factual context suggest that the decision in BCCT is not determinative.
Social and legal conceptions of equality on the basis of sexual orientation have progressed over the past 14 years
Many of the Benchers of the Law Society of British Columbia made submissions during that body's deliberations on whether to approve TWU's proposed law degree that followed an almost formulaic pattern.
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They opened their submissions with a strongly worded condemnation of TWU's discriminatory practices followed by an assertion, in reference to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in BCCT, that the law is the law and they are bound to follow the law. now been compelled by its own membership to reverse its decision to approve TWU): 101 I am…troubled by the very many comments to the effect that the Community Covenant is repugnant, it's hurtful, it's discriminatory, it's hypocritical, it's heartless, but we're bound by the law.…I don't recognize a law that is so divorced from justice….We are the law-making body charged with making the decision at hand. So long as that decision is a reasonable one and [one] that reflects both the objects of our statute and the Charter values we are bound to embrace, it will be a law that the Supreme Court of Canada respects. The law is never frozen in time. It is always evolving….I urge you…to reconsider your decision and make sure that the law that you are applying is a just law. 104 Rather, my argument is that the context in which this balancing would be done has changed. Legal recognition of the equality interests of sexual minorities is more thorough today than it was in 2001. 105 Consider the following example. In 1993 the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the claim that excluding same-sex couples from legal marriage constituted a violation of section 15 of the Charter. 109 They did so in part on the basis that including same-sex couples in the institution of marriage did not comport with the traditional Christian understanding of marriage as the union of one man and one woman as defined in Hyde v. Hyde. 110 The majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the claimants were seeking to use section 15 of the Charter to change this Christian definition of marriage and that the Charter could not have that effect. 
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It is certainly true, as suggested by some proponents of approval of TWU, that in Whatcott the "Supreme Court has 'reaffirmed its commitment to an analytical approach that balances equality rights against other rights protected under the Charter, giving appropriate weight to each. '" 116 But consider that between 1993 and 2003, in balancing the equality interests motivating the pursuit of same-sex marriage with religious and social beliefs about the Christian definition of marriage, the "appropriate weight" attributed to equality for gays and lesbians increased. As a result, the same Court, within a ten-year span, arrived at very different conclusions on the same question. 117 The point is that the "appropriate weight" attributed to the values or interests to be balanced will fundamentally inform the outcome of the balancing analysis. It matters what you put on each end of the teeter-totter. 112 . Halpern, supra note 105 at 1. 113. Ibid. 114. Egan v Canada, supra note 45 (recognizing that sexual orientation is a prohibited ground of discrimination under section 15.) Note that in Layland the Ontario Court of Appeal also recognized that section 15 protected sexual orientation. Therefore, the distinction between Layland and Halpern cannot be explained by arguing that in 1993, pre-Egan, the Ontario Court of Appeal simply did not recognize sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination. 115. M&H, supra note 45 (recognizing that excluding same-sex couples from the benefits offered to heterosexual common-law couples promoted the view that they were less worthy and contributed to their social erasure). 116. Gomery Opinion, supra note 23. See also the submissions to the LSBC from the UBC Faculty of Law student working group on freedom of religion: Law Society of British Columbia, "TWU Submissions" (2 March 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWUsubmissions.pdf> at page 58. 117. This is not to concede that a Court today in reviewing a law society decision not to approve TWU's law degree program would be adjudicating on the same issue. In fact, as noted in section 5, there are compelling arguments to suggest that the issue facing law societies today can be distinguished from the issue confronting the Court in BCCT. See Pothier, supra note 63.
Contrary to the suggestions of some proponents of approval, 118
Whatcott does not contradict, or even speak to, this point. In fact, Whatcott offers an additional example of the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has increased the degree of protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation recognized under the Charter. More to the point, it offers this example precisely in the context of TWU's Community Covenant. As noted above, Whatcott's reliance on L'Heuruex-Dubé J.'s dissent in BCCT established that when balancing freedom of religion with the impact on equality interests perpetuated by TWU's covenant, the fact that the Covenant bans gay sex rather than gay individuals is not relevant.
119 This is a shift from the majority's approach in BCCT. In characterizing the implications of TWU's covenant, the majority in BCCT, unlike L'Heureux-Dubé J., appear to have placed some significance on the distinction between condemning sexual practices and condemning sexual minorities. 120 In Whatcott the Court clearly adopted L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s approach on this issue. Why? Likely because in the intervening years between these two cases the Court developed a more informed and richer understanding of the dignity interests compromised by a code of conduct that prohibits same-sex sexual intimacy.
Decisions regarding approval of TWU's program for public purposes must balance freedom of religion and equality for gays and lesbians based on 2014 legal norms and social values, not those of nearly 15 years ago. Legal recognition of the equality interests of sexual minorities in Canada has expanded significantly. In 2001 the Court in BCCT concluded that an appropriate balance was struck because gays and lesbians could go elsewhere to become teachers (an argument that some proponents of 118. Laskin Opinion in SAC Report, supra note 16; Law Society of British Columbia, "TWU Material" (8 May 2013), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/newsroom/TWU-material. pdf> at page 9. 119. Whatcott, supra note 86. 120. BCCT, supra note 13 at 22:
[The Court of Appeal] pointed out that the TWU documents make no reference to homosexuals or to sexual orientation, but only to practices that the particular student is asked to give up himself, or herself, while at TWU. These practices include drunkenness, profanity, harassment, dishonesty, abortion, the occult and sexual sins of a heterosexual and homosexual nature. There is no evidence before this Court that anyone has been denied admission because of refusal to sign the document or was expelled because of non-adherence to it. While it is not clear from this paragraph how much significance the majority in BCCT placed on the act/identity distinction, it does read as if the distinction was given some weight and the majority certainly does not reject the distinction as did Justice L'Heureux-Dubé in BCCT and the unanimous court in Whatcott. 644 The Dalhousie Law Journal approval also make today regarding prospective gay law students). 121 In 2014 it is likely not sufficiently cognizant of gay and lesbian equality simply to say "TWU is not for everybody" 122 and in the interests of religious liberty the gays can go elsewhere to become lawyers.
The basis for denying accreditation to TWU's law school is different than in BCCT Some proponents of approval have asserted that the grounds I suggested for refusing TWU's application should be rejected because "Professor Craig provides no evidence to support the contention that" TWU law graduates would discriminate against gays and lesbians. 123 According to them, BCCT established that it would be unreasonable for a professional regulator to refuse approval of a professional program at TWU without concrete evidence that TWU graduates would discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
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The grounds for rejecting TWU that I advanced in "The Case for Rejecting TWU's Proposed Law School" were not based on the assumption or suggestion that hypothetical TWU law graduates would discriminate. 125 In BCCT the College of Teachers justified its refusal to accredit TWU because of a concern that its graduates would engage in discriminatory conduct as public school teachers. 126 The College did not offer any evidence to support that concern. Whether reviewed on a standard of correctness or reasonableness the College's decision would probably have been overturned. However, for proponents of approval to argue that, as a result of the reasoning in BCCT, any decision to refuse institutional approval to TWU must be backed by empirical evidence of discrimination by TWU graduates is an example of the tail wagging the dog. It does not appear that the decision to refuse accreditation was based 121. See Laskin Opinion in SAC Report, supra note 16. See also Newman, supra note 57 at 6. The argument that gays and lesbians are not forced to attend TWU employs the same problematic reasoning that has been soundly rejected with respect to other prohibited grounds of discrimination. In 1940, in the name of freedom of commerce, and because the tavern was a private business, the Supreme Court of Canada found that it was not contrary to good morals or public order for a bar owner to refuse to serve African Canadians (Christie v York, [1940 on a concern that TWU law graduates would discriminate. 127 Evidence of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation likely would be required if it were. However, it does not make sense to assess the NSBS and LSUC decisions based on whether there was evidence to support a concern that does not appear to have formed the basis of their decisions.
BCCT can be distinguished on its facts
The context of TWU's application for certification of its teacher training program was quite different than the context of its request for accreditation of a TWU law school. In "An Argument Against Accreditation of the Trinity Western University's Proposed Law School" Dianne Pothier identifies three important factors that distinguish BCCT from the decision of law societies on whether to accredit TWU's proposed law degree. 128 First, unlike with respect to its law degree, TWU had a history of prior approval of its teacher training program.
129 When TWU made its application for certification of its teacher training program it already had approval from the College for an education degree in which the first four years occurred at TWU followed by a fifth year at Simon Fraser. The application was simply to move the fifth year from Simon Fraser to TWU. Second, in BCCT the majority emphasized that there was no evidence to suggest that the College's requirement that TWU students complete a fifth year at Simon Fraser was related to concerns regarding the Community Covenant. Unlike the Simon Fraser program, which did not include an anti-discrimination component, law schools are required to teach legal principles of equality. 130 Refusal to accredit based on a concern regarding the institutional capacity to deliver a human rights and equality curriculum was not considered in BCCT. Third, lawyers are involved in the interpretation and administration of equality and anti-discrimination provisions under human rights legislation and the constitution. 131 This extra level of responsibility, borne uniquely by 127. Neither the LSUC nor the NSBS provided written reasons for their decisions. However, neither the transcripts of the Ontario debates (<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/twu/>) the Memorandum drafted by the Executive Committee of the NSBS (<http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ftp/ CouncilMaterials/2014-04-16_TWUMemoCouncil.pdf>), nor the press releases issued by either Society (available at <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/twu/> and <http://nsbs.org/news/2014/04/council-votesoption-c-trinity-western-university-law-school-decision>) indicate that their reasons not to approve related to a concern that TWU law graduates would discriminate. Indeed, many of the Ontario Benchers specified very clearly that their concern was with offering approval at an institutional level. lawyers, distinguishes BCCT from the issues at stake in the decision to accredit a TWU law school.
132
VI. Opposition to TWU's law school should not be dismissed as antiChristian Some supporters of approval of TWU's law degree have mischaracterized concerns regarding this specific institution's policies as arguments opposed to the notion of teaching from a Christian worldview. The Federation's SAC Report, for example, depicted the opposition to TWU as, in part, based on an assertion that "TWU's Christian worldview and intention to teach from this perspective makes it incapable of effectively teaching legal ethics, constitutional and human rights law." 133 The Federation also implied that challenges to TWU's institutional capacity to teach legal ethics and human rights and equality law amounted to a claim about the ethics and competence of all Christian lawyers and judges.
134
The deficiencies with TWU's proposed program do not flow from its Christian worldview or intention to teach from that perspective. Presumably, many ethical members of the profession share with TWU a Christian worldview. Faith-based universities are not, simply by virtue of their Christian mandate, incapable of teaching critical thinking skills or equality and human rights. Many worthy and highly esteemed educational institutions, such as St Francis Xavier, Trinity College at the University of Toronto, and Notre Dame in the United States, have a faithbased tradition. The distinction, and it is an important one, is that these institutions do not impose formal policies that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or mandate a statement of faith that is inconsistent with creating an institutional environment consistent with some aspects of the requirements that the law societies have arrived at in accrediting Canadian common law degrees.
In "The Case for Rejecting TWU's Proposed Law School" I argued that the specific institutional policies of this particular university, as articulated in its Community Covenant and Statement of Faith, are inconsistent with some of the criteria for approval identified by law societies in Canada. The Federation itself recognized concerns regarding TWU's capacity to teach ethics and public law, given the Community Covenant:
132. Ibid at 5. 133. SAC Report, supra note 16 at page 11. 134. The Federation's SAC report, ibid, in concluding that the argument that TWU's Christian worldview means that students will fail to acquire the necessary critical thinking skills is without merit, notes that many current members of the profession and the judiciary share this Christian worldview and that there is no evidence that they are unable to think critically or act ethically.
[T]he members of the Approval Committee see a tension between the proposed teaching of these required competencies and elements of the Community Covenant. In particular, the Approval Committee is concerned that some of the underlying beliefs reflected in the Community Covenant, which members of faculty are required to embrace as a condition of employment, may constrain the appropriate teaching and thus the required understanding of equality rights and the ethical obligation not to discriminate against any person….
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A Christian worldview may be entirely consistent with critical thinking or instruction on human rights and equality. However, the specific institutional policies of this particular university, as articulated in its Community Covenant and Statement of Faith, are inconsistent with the ethical duty not to discriminate. 136 Concepts of equality and non-discrimination cannot properly be taught in a learning environment created by an institution with policies that are explicitly discriminatory and that mandate discriminatory beliefs.
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Consider the affidavit evidence of one former TWU student (submitted in support of an ongoing constitutional challenge to the decision of the British Columbia government to accredit TWU's proposed law degree):
The Community Covenant is a part of the TWU culture and reflects that culture….The effect of this was that people did not give opinions in class discussions that did not align with those values. Another effect was that professors carefully avoided expressing opinions that did not align with the Covenant and TWU's values….Some professors would condemn homosexual activity, and none would condone….In discussion groups, gay and lesbian issues came up frequently, but people were very unlikely to raise opinions that were contrary to the covenant's disavowal of sex outside of marriage and relationships between same-sex couples. 138 It obscures the institutionalized deficiencies in TWU's proposed program to cast arguments opposed to approval as an attack on all Christian based educational instruction.
In a similar vein, proponents of approval have based some of their arguments on the potential contribution of a Christian law school. 139 The claim is that a Christian law school would offer a unique contribution to legal education in Canada that is not currently available. It rests in part on an affirmation of the worth of Christian educational institutions and scholarship. 140 This assertion, in as much as it was offered to respond to my argument, is misdirected. Opposition to approval of TWU on the basis that its Community Covenant discriminates, and that its mandatory Statement of Faith does not facilitate open engagement with some issues, does not impugn, or even speak to, the important scholarly contributions made by religiously based law schools or the desirability of offering an accredited non-secular legal education in Canada.
141
VII. The decisions of the LSUC and the NSBS not to approve TWU were reasonable On 24 April 2014 the Law Society of Upper Canada decided not to approve TWU's proposed law degree for purposes of entry to the legal profession in Ontario. 142 On 25 April 2014 the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society decided not to approve TWU's proposed law school unless the institution exempts law students from signing the Community Covenant or amends the Community Covenant for law students in a way that removes its discriminatory aspects. 143 In both Ontario and Nova Scotia these decisions were arrived at through lengthy, transparent processes that involved public consultation, oral and written submissions by TWU, members of the profession, public, and legal academy, and open debate among the voting and non-voting members of each governing body. As noted in the introduction, TWU has commenced legal proceedings in each province. 145 In its 2012 decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that decisions like the ones made by the LSUC and the NSBS should receive deference by reviewing courts.
146 Not only were these expert decision-makers applying their home statutes (a decision-making function that will be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness), 147 but in exercising their discretion in this capacity they were required to consider and balance competing Charter values (which the Court in Doré confirmed will also receive deference). On review, the central question that will be asked of the NSBS and the LSUC is whether these law societies, in advancing the public mandate stipulated under their enabling statues, properly balanced the competing values at stake. Did they secure a proportionate balance between their statutory objectives and these competing Charter values?
148 Again, this question is to be pursued by a reviewing court in a manner reflective of deference-that is to say, on a standard of reasonableness.
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In deciding whether to approve TWU's proposed law degree, the LSUC and the NSBS were required to balance freedom of religion and equality. Several factors suggest that the decisions of the LSBC and the NSBS were reasonable in light of their statutory obligations to regulate in the public interest in their respective provinces.
First, it is reasonable for a law society to conclude that in the context of delivering an accredited legal education, the right to act on a belief in the sinfulness of same-sex intimacy is narrower than the right to believe that same-sex intimacy is sinful. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion offers a spectrum of protections. 150 In its application to the government of British Columbia for authority to confer law degrees, TWU emphasized the secular nature of its proposed law school. 151 TWU's own description of its proposed law degree program emphasizes the secular The limit imposed by the NSBS and LSUC decisions pertains to conduct (imposition of a mandatory code of conduct) rather than belief, and places a limit on an activity (provision of a fully accredited law degree program) that TWU itself has framed in secular terms.
The question faced by the LSUC and the NSBS was not: Do we approve of TWU's beliefs? The NSBS and the LSUC determined that they were unable to offer institutional approval to TWU because of the institution's discriminatory practices. 153 The NSBS voted to approve TWU conditional on it removing the discriminatory aspects of the Covenant. The NSBS also made it clear that its decision not to grant conditional approval was with respect to the institution. It does not create an absolute bar to the practice of law in Nova Scotia for future TWU law graduates. The issue facing the NSBS and the LSUC related specifically to the public approval or accreditation of an institution that excludes same-sex minorities. As was emphasized by Nova Scotia Council members and Ontario Benchers, TWU and its graduates are free to believe and preach whatever they choose regarding the immorality of same-sex intimacy. 154 In terms of practices, they are free to pursue the study of law. They are free to educate lawyers who can gain entry to the legal profession through channels other than attendance at an accredited institution. 155 They are certainly free to abstain from engaging in practices involving same-sex sexual intimacy. Freedom of religion should protect these practices. However, freedom of religion is not absolute. Some limits on religious rights are reasonable-particuarly those that impose costs on religious practitioners rather than compel certain beliefs or deny meaningful choice: "The Charter guarantees freedom of religion, but does not indemnify practitioners against all costs incident to the practice of religion."
156 Imposing costs "on the religious practictioner in terms of money, tradition or inconveinance" does not preclude choice as to religious belief or practice. 157 In a diverse and multi-cultural society such costs will often be reasonable, particularly, as in this case, where the cost relates to an "inability to access conditional benefits or privileges conferred by law…."
158 Conferral of an accredited law degree is a privilege. In Ontario and Nova Scotia, the cost to a religious organization of delivering a legal education through an institution with discriminatory policies is lack of law society accreditation for the institution. This is not a serious infringement on religious freedom. 159 The NSBS and LSUC decisions represent a measured and proportionate balance between freedom of religion and protection of equality.
Second, it is reasonable for a law society to question whether fundamental aspects of an accredited Canadian legal education, such as an understanding of equality rights and the ethical obligation not to discriminate, can be adequately taught in a setting of institutionalized discrimination. 160 In making its decision the LSUC had before it a report from the Approval Committee of the Federation indicating concerns that "the underlying beliefs reflected in the Community Covenant…may constrain the appropriate teaching and thus the required understanding of equality rights and the ethical obligation not to discriminate against any person." 161 As noted in the previous section, unlike the teacher training program at issue in BCCT, law schools are required to teach legal principles of equality under the Constitution and human rights legislation. TWU did not offer the Federation or the LSUC any explanation as to how it would address these concerns. 162 This was a report written subsequent to the Approval Committee receiving the report of the SAC. The NSBS also had the Approval Committee's report. Given the explanation of Option C in the Memorandum from the Executive to NSBS Council, supra note 154, the concern about this tension may not have factored into the NSBS decision. The opening paragraph of the Option C description states: 'Council accepts the Report of the Federation Approval Committee that, subject to the concerns and comments noted, the TWU program will meet the national requirement." 162. See Pothier, supra note 63 at 3: "In its submissions…TWU said only that key cases on sexual orientation equality would be taught, and standard texts relied upon….The real question is not what will be taught, but how it will be taught." TWU that it would address these concerns. However, it was certainly open to, and reasonable of, the LSUC not to accept these simple assertions from TWU. In the face of admissions and hiring policies that explicitly discriminate, and a report from the committee charged with reviewing the program expressing concerns regarding the school's ability to properly teach equality and human rights in such a context, it is reasonable for a professional regulator to refuse to accredit without more than bare assurances of how these concerns would be addressed.
Third, in exercising their statutory mandates to regulate in the public interest it is necessary for the NSBS and the LSUC to consider whether TWU's hiring and admissions policies are inconsistent with human rights legislation in Nova Scotia and Ontario. 163 In BCCT the Court suggested that TWU's policies would be exempt under British Columbia's human rights legislation. 164 The Court in BCCT only addressed the British Columbia human rights regime and in fact only did so indirectly. It did not actually consider the potential discriminatory impact of the code of conduct on TWU students or staff. 165 In "The Case for Rejecting TWU's Proposed Law School" I argued that the majority of provinces do not have religious exemption clauses identical to the one found in the British Columbia legislation and that it was incumbent upon regulators of the legal profession to consider whether TWU's policies would be unlawful in their province.
166 Nova Scotia's Human Rights Act does not create an exception for the student admissions policies of religiously based university programs. 167 of TWU's law degree on the condition that it remove from its Community Covenant those aspects that are inconsistent with Nova Scotia's human rights legislation. 168 A decision of this nature reflects a just, reasonable and proportionate balance between freedom of religion and equality.
TWU has contested the applicability of Nova Scotia's human rights legislation, arguing that reliance on Nova Scotia's Human Rights Act is precluded by principles of extra-territoriality. 169 There are significant flaws with TWU's reasoning on this point. The primary authority that TWU relies on for its assertion is an Ontario Human Rights Tribunal decision that supports a conclusion opposite to TWU's position. In Cohen v. Law School Admission Council the Tribunal concluded that it did not have jurisdiction regarding a complaint arising from a decision by Dalhousie University not to admit the complainant to Dalhousie's law school.
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The claim stemmed from an allegation that the Law School Admission Council denied accommodation of his disability with respect to the writing of the Law School Admission Test in Ontario. The complainant alleged that Dalhousie University discriminated against him by denying him entry based on his LSAT score even though the university knew he had not been accommodated. The Tribunal concluded that the claimant's allegation against Dalhousie lacked a sufficient connection to Ontario. Although the alleged failure to accommodate occurred in Ontario, the decision not to admit Cohen occurred in Nova Scotia. The Ontario legislation could not be applied to Dalhousie University's admissions decision. The applicable legislation was Nova Scotia's Human Rights Act. Cohen is a (non-binding) authority for the proposition that Nova Scotia's Human Rights Act applies to a decision-maker in Nova Scotia with respect to discriminatory acts occurring in another province by someone else, upon which the Nova Scotia decision-maker relies. Cohen is similar to the circumstances surrounding the NSBS decision and supports the NSBS's reliance on, or consideration of, Nova Scotia's human rights legislation. The other nonbinding authorities relied on by TWU simply illustrate the uncontroversial fact that provincial statutes cannot apply to matters that have no connection to the enacting province. 171 Moreover, TWU's argument fails on its own logic. It is true that according to the principle of extra-territoriality Nova Scotia's Human Rights Act is not applicable to the actions of TWU in British Columbia, but neither is British Columbia's human rights legislation, and more specifically its exemption purportedly rendering TWU's discrimination lawful in British Columbia, applicable to a decision of the NSBS in Nova Scotia. What is applicable to the decision of the NSBS is Nova Scotia's Human Rights Act, and under this legislation it would appear that TWU's policy is unlawful. The fact that the Covenant would constitute unlawful discrimination if TWU were situated in Nova Scotia should be considered by the NSBS in its deliberations as to whether approval of the TWU law degree is in the public interest of Nova Scotia. Human rights legislation is quasi-constitutional. 173 It "must be recognized as being the law of the people…."
174 As a matter of democratic principle the NSBS should not be bound by a statutory exemption that may make TWU's policy lawful discrimination in British Columbia, but that was not adopted by the people's elected lawmakers in Nova Scotia. Administrative decisionmakers should exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with the values and principles reflected in the human rights legislation to which they are bound. 175 Again, it is reasonable for the NSBS not to accredit an extra-provincial institution in Nova Scotia for Nova Scotia purposes based on a conclusion that its policies are contrary to the human rights values adopted in Nova Scotia. Similarly, it would be reasonable for the LSUC not to approve a proposed law degree from an institution if the 172. Pinto Opinion, supra note 23 at 3 and 4. 173. Tranchemontagne, supra note 163 at 33. 174. Ibid. 175. For an analysis demonstrating that the exemptions under Nova Scotia's human rights legislation would not apply to a TWU law school, see Letter from the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission to the NSBS, supra note 167.
LSUC concluded that the institution's policies conflict with the values and principles reflected in Ontario's human rights legislation.
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Lastly on this point, the failure of Nova Scotia (or Ontario) to provide religious organizations with the same exemption purportedly offered in British Columbia is not an unjustifiable violation of section 2 of the Charter.
177 Nova Scotia does accommodate religious organizations by including an exemption under its human rights legislation for some forms of religiously motivated discrimination in employment practices. 178 The exemption does not apply to student admissions policies. Even if this narrower exemption found under Nova Scotia's Human Rights Act was found to be a prima facie violation of section 2 of the Charter, it would almost certainly be upheld as a reasonable, well-tailored, and minimally impairing infringement under section 1 of the Charter.
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Fourth, it is reasonable for a law society to conclude that public accreditation by the legal profession of an institution that excludes sexual minorities will further stigmatize a historically disadvantaged minority and have a significant adverse effect on the social status of gays and lesbians. 180 It is reasonable to conclude that it is in the public interest to place a limit on religiously based discriminatory actions in an effort to avoid this adverse effect on the social status of sexual minorities. This argument was not advanced in BCCT. 181 The Supreme Court of Canada in Whatcott, albeit in the context of considering the constitutionality of prohibitions on hate speech against sexual minorities, concluded that in 176. In making its decision, the LSUC had before it a legal opinion (Pinto opinion, supra note 23) highlighting a leading human rights case in Ontario in which an Evangelical Christian organization that operated group homes in Ontario was not entitled to impose upon a lesbian support worker a religiously based code of conduct that prohibited same-sex intimacy. According to the Divisional Court in Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Christian Horizons, 2010 ONSC 2105, 319 DLR (4th) 477, the organization could not avail itself of the exemption offered under the Code because a ban on same-sex relationships was not sufficiently connected to the employee's duties. 177. TWU raises this argument in its submissions to LSUC: Reply Submission of TWU to LSUC: Law Society of Upper Canada, "TWU Submissions" (22 April 2014), online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc. on.ca/twu/#twusubmission>. 178. Human Rights Act, supra note 167. 179. A fully developed Charter analysis is beyond the scope of this article. Some of the factors that indicate that a prima facie violation would be upheld under section 1 include the following: The infringement on religious freedom relates to a limit on (discriminatory) actions not beliefs. It is narrowly tailored so as to allow religious organizations to discriminate in some contexts-such as employment. There are other avenues through which TWU graduates could become members of the NSBS. In conducting a justification analysis under section 1, a court would consider both the limit on religious freedom and the harmful effect on others. A broader exemption would have a significant adverse effect on others. 180. Systemic discrimination of this nature was considered by the NSBS: "the systemic discrimination of the institution is what must be addressed and rejected." Memo to the NSBS, supra note 154 at page 18. 181. BCCT, supra note 13. assessing the reasonableness of a limit on section 2 of the Charter, proof of actual harm may not be either possible or required. 182 The reasoning in Whatcott demonstrates the Court's recognition of the inherent difficulty of proving the harmful effects on sexual minorities of some discriminatory practices. In other words, Whatcott reveals the Court's willingness to take into account the evidentiary challenges of proving systemic discrimination when balancing competing Charter values. 183 The Court held that the discriminatory effects of hate speech are common knowledge and that it was reasonable for the legislature to assume that hate speech against sexual minorities will diminish their social standing, stigmatize sexual minority identities and perpetuate harm to the dignity and equality interests of sexual minorities.
184 This is not to equate the hate speech engaged in by the respondent in Whatcott with TWU's exclusionary policy. 185 Rather, it is to note that the Court in Whatcott concluded that it is reasonable for decisionmakers to draw common sense inferences about the relationship between stigma and systemic discrimination. The impugned conduct does not need to rise to the level of harm to social status at issue in Whatcott in order to 182 . Whatcott, supra note 86 at HN: "The difficulty of establishing causality and the seriousness of the harm to vulnerable groups justifies the imposition of preventive measures that do not require proof of actual harm. The discriminatory effects of hate speech are part of the everyday knowledge and experience of Canadians. As such, the legislature is entitled to a reasonable apprehension of societal harm as a result of hate speech." 183. The Court had previously recognized the evidentiary challenges to proving the systemic discrimination perpetuated by hate speech (see R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697). Whatcott is the first time they recognized this in the context of equality for sexual minorities. 184. Whatcott, supra note 86. 185. TWU has argued that "[t]he attempt of opponents to link TWU with the behaviour of Mr. Whatcott is offensive." According to TWU's written submissions to the LSUC expressing hate towards any person is "directly contrary to TWU's religious values…." TWU, Reply Submissions to LSUC (22 April 2014), online: LUSC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/TWUsubmissionreplytoLSUC.pdf> at para 72. TWU's indignation at being linked to Whatcott, and its assertion that the type of expression engaged in by Bill Whatcott is contrary to religious belief at TWU, are surprising. TWU was founded by the Evangelical Free Churches of Canada and America. Today, TWU describes itself as "an arm" of the church. See TWU, "About TWU: Fact Sheet," online: TWU <https://twu.ca/about/fact-sheet.html>. The EFFC intervened in Whatcott in order to support Bill Whatcott's right to engage in hateful expression. See EFFC, "Factum of the Intervener," online: <http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/whatcott>. The EFFC, of which TWU is an arm, argued that evangelical Christians sincerely believe that they are compelled to share the tenets of their faith with the community even when their beliefs are offensive (note that the Court in Whatcott found, at para 57, that the speech the EFCC was defending went well beyond offensive). The EFCC did not condone the words chosen by Bill Whatcott. However, not only did the church argue for his right to use them in order to convey his homophobic messages, it argued that for evangelical Christians conveying beliefs that may be offensive to the public is part of their religion. Also of note, in its submissions to the LSUC, TWU stated that in Whatcott, in the context of hate speech, the Court rightly rejected the distinction between targeting behaviour and targeting sexual identity. This is certainly not what the EFCC, of which TWU is an arm, argued in Whatcott. Indeed, the EFFC factum, ibid, beginning at para 30, contains an entire section defending the distinction they draw between sexual act and sexual identity.
rely on Whatcott's conclusion that the difficulty of establishing causality in the context of systemic discrimination justifies placing some limits on religious and expressive freedom even in the absence of specific proof. Moreover, it may be that the social status of sexual minorities is actually placed in greater jeopardy by the public accreditation of a law school that excludes gays and lesbians than by the homophobic ranting of one individual. The expressive effect of accreditation by the legal profession is much more difficult to recognize and ignore than is the anti-gay religious expression of one man.
The question that should be posed post-Whatcott is the following: is it a matter of common knowledge that accreditation by a state authorized public actor of a law school that excludes gays and lesbians would affect the "social status and acceptance in the eyes of the majority" of this vulnerable group? 186 It is reasonable for law societies to consider the impact on the public interest effected by offering law society imprimatur to an institution that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.
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Consider an analogy to an institution with a religiously based behavioural code that prohibits sexual intimacy except that between one man and one woman of the same race. Even without concrete evidence of harm, it would be reasonable for a law society to conclude that public accreditation of such an institution would further stigmatize racialized groups in Canada. 188 On the same basis, it is reasonable for the LSUC and the NSBS to conclude that accrediting an institution that prohibits same-sex sexual intimacy would stigmatize and lower the social status of gays and lesbians in Ontario and Nova Scotia. Whatcott supports this reasoning.
Conclusion
TWU has a Community Covenant that only permits gays and lesbians to attend at considerable personal cost to their dignity and sense of selfworth.
189 TWU has a non-discrimination policy that covers race, colour, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, marital or family status, pardoned convictions, and physical or mental disabilities but does not cover sexual orientation. 190 In assessing this university's commitment to equality for sexual minorities, these institutional actions should be given considerably more weight than that given to the university's bare assertions proclaiming a commitment to the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
191
Law societies in British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan should consider whether they would have approved TWU's law degree if its policy prohibited sexual intimacy except that which occurs within the sanctity of marriage between a man and woman of the same race. Similarly, would the Federation have recommended giving a stamp of approval to a law school that prohibits inter-racial couples?
The analogy is direct and apt. 192 Bob Jones University, an American post-secondary institution, did precisely this and did so on the grounds of 191. See Letter from TWU President Raymond to Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 31, claiming that TWU respects the equality rights of gays and lesbians. 192. During public deliberations by the Benchers of the LSBC, Lynal Doerksen argued that this comparison is "neither direct nor apt" for three reasons: (1) the belief that interracial marriage is wrong is offensive in and of itself (unlike the belief that same-sex marriage is wrong), (2) the belief that marriage is only meant to be between people of the same race is not a tenet of the majority or any of the world's major religions, and (3) the belief that marriage is between a man and a woman is explicitly condoned in Canadian law under the Civil Marriage Act. See Law Society of British Columbia, "Bencher Meeting" (11 April 2014), online: LSBC <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/ newsroom/TWU-transcript.pdf> at 13:20. Doerksen's submissions reveal a misunderstanding of constitutional law and the significance of the preamble to the Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 33, as well as unfounded empirical assertions. First, while the belief that same-sex marriage is wrong is clearly not offensive to Doerkson, one might well question whether it is in fact offensive to many people. More importantly, the offensiveness of either of these beliefs is entirely irrelevant to the aptness of the analogy or the decision on whether to approve TWU's proposed law degree. Second, the history of religiously supported anti-miscegenation laws across many parts of the United States prior to the 1967 decision in Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967), combined with a rich academic literature examining these laws (see, e.g., Fay Botham, Almighty God Created the Races: Christianity, Interracial Marriage, & American Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009)) belies Doerksen's unsupported claim that opposition to interracial marriage was not founded on the beliefs of Christian religions. Third, he is simply wrong to assert that the Civil Marriage Act, ibid, condones any particular belief about the definition of marriage. The preamble to the Civil Marriage Act affirms the uncontentious point that nothing in that Act affects the guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion to hold, declare, and publicly express diverse views on marriage. Section 3.1 of the Act, which is superfluous, clarifies once again that the Charter protects freedom from discrimination on the basis of religion and freedom of religious belief, including the belief that marriage is the union of one man and one woman. 
